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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
leasehold. 14 These cases do not overrule the established doctrine, but sidestep it to allow the condemnee the amount he would receive in a voluntary
sale. 5
In the instant case the expropriation for a term originally less than the
entire leasehold period, with an 0 option to renew, which was exercised
exhausting the lessee's interest, is considered as if it were a taking of the
entire leasehold interest rather than an expropriation for a shorter period.
This case extends the definition of a "taking of an entire leasehold" to include one which does not entirely exhaust the lessee's interest originally,
but which does so by the exercise of an option to renew, thus disallowing
the cost of removal under both sets of facts.

EMINENT DOMAIN'W-JUST COMPENSATION-WARTIME
IMPOSED CEILING PRICES
The United States expropriated a commodity from a long term speculator whose purpose was to hold and sell at future high prices. At the time
of the taking, the maximum market price, specified by regulation under
the Emergency Price Control Act,' was lower than the purchase price and
storage costs of the commodity to the owner. The Court of Claims took
cognizance of these facts and allowed compensation greater than this ceiling
price.2 Held, that just compensation as measured by fair market value was
correctly determined by the ceiling price established by the OPA, because
this was the only legal maximum selling price. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 70 Sup. Ct. 547 (1950).
The exercise of the power3 of eminent domain for necessary public
use is subject to the constitutional requirement that just compensation be
made for the property taken. 4 The amount of remuneration paid as compensation follows no strict formula,8 but is normally determined as a judicial
function,0 by the fair market price at the time of the taking.7 In a free
14. James McMillan Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W. R.R., 216 Pa. 504, 65
At. 1091 (1902); Metropolitan West Side El. R.R. v. Siegel, 161 11.638, 44 N.E.. 276
(1896).
15. Metropolitan West Side El. R.R. v. Siegel, srura note 12.

1.56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. Ap. § 901 (1946).
2. United States v. Commodities Trading.Corp., 83 F. Supp. 356 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
3. See United States v. Gettysburg Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (implied power);
TIHOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2575 (Penn. ed. 1939) (inherent power).
4. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 149
U.S. 312, 341 (1892).
5. United States v. Cors. 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co.,
327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946); Wilson Mfg. Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d 915, 918 (7th
Cit. 1947).
6. See National City Bank of N.Y. v. United States, 275 Fed. 855, 859 (S.D. N.Y.
1921).
7. Louisville Flying Service. Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Ky.
1945); C. C. Blacke Co. v. United States, 275 Fed. 861 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
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market, the value of the property taken is based on the amount at which
a sale would be consummated by willing bargainers9 irrespective of the
possible use to which the government will subject the property. 10
With the advent of war, limitations" were imposed upon sellers of
commodities. These controls restricted the normal criteria for measuring
just compensation in the most vital part-the free market. 12 Congress, as
a consequence of this emergency, also authorized the president to requisition
all materials necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.' 8 Since the
use of this power did not restrict or suspend the requirement to pay just
compensation,1 4 and the free market was for all practical purposes destroyed,
a new standard, ceiling price, came into being as the measure of compensation. 15 The lower federal courts, while generally following this new concept, 16 did frequently indicate that other factors,17 such as future use,"
storage expenses."0 retention value,20 and replacement value, 21 should be
taken into consideration.
The Supreme Court on the other hand, impliedly rejects all determinants other than ceiling price. In an earlier case,2 2 the Court merely decided
that the petitioner did not sustain the burden of proving that the ceiling
price was not just compensation. But, in the instant case it was determined
that ceiling price "should be accepted as the maximum measure of compensation."28 Justice Jackson, who dissented in both cases, said, "It is hard
to see how just compensation can be the legal equivalent of a controlled
8. Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 123 (1924) (value may
be less than cost); Kinter v. United States, 156 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1946); Love v.
United States, 141 F.2d 981, 982 (5th Cir. 1944) (value may be greater or less than
investment).
9. See Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, supra note 8, at 125.
10. United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943): United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369 (1942); see Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
II. See note I supra.
12. See note 6 supra.
13. 55 STAT. 742, 50 U.S.C. APP. . 721 (1942).
14. United States v. New River Collieries Co._ 262 U.S. 341 (1923); United
States v. McFarland, 15 F.2d 823. 826 (4th Cir. 1926).
15. Cudahy v. United States, 155 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1946).
16. Graves v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. N.Y. 1945); accord, Edward
Stahel & Co. v. United States, 78 F, Supp. 800 (Ct. Cl. 1948); WValker v. United
States, 64 F. Supp. 135 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
17. Sudametal Sociedad Anonima v. United States, 88 F. Snipp. 293 (Ct. Cl. 1950);
Williams v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 207(Ct. Cl. 1948); Wilson Mfg. Co. v. United
States, supra note 5, at 917; accord, Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748
(Ct. Cl. 1949) (allowed less than the retail selling price, because plaintiff seller controlled the market and kept the price high); United States v. Buxton Lines, 16i F.2d
993 (4th Cir. 1948) (just compensation was more than nominal even though the owner
of the property profited from the requisitioning).
18. Fabrica Uraguaya De Neumaticos, S. A. v. United States, 84 F. Stipp. 745 (Ct.
CI. 1947).
19. See Kaiser v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 588, 590 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
20. Amer-Hawalan S.S. Co. v. United States, 85 F, Supp. 825 (S.D. N.Y. 1949);
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., supra note 2.
21. John J. Felin & Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 1017, 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1947),
rev'd 334 U.S. 624 (1947).
22. United States v. John 1. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1947).
23. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 70 Sup. Ct. 547, 552 (1950).
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price unless a controlled price is also always required to equal just compensation .... -24 Justice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion in
United States v. John 7. Felin 6 Co., 25 but dissented in the principal case.
He claimed that the question of compensation was a factual one, and that
though the ceiling price was not irrelevant in resolving compensation, it
should not be the sole determining factor. Continuing, he wrote that
"generally fair and equitable" 26 ceiling prices might give rise to such individual hardships as to make taking at this price unjust compensation.
However, both justices agreed with the majority that "retention value" was not
to be used in determining compensation. Justice Frankfurter felt that it
was valid to reject retention value because it might be speculative, but because the Court refused to consider costs in measuring compensation, he
disagreed with the majority. 8
In dciding this case, the Court states that a payment in excess of the
controlled price will be allowed upon proof that this price is not just compensation. However, there is no indication as to what condition or hardship
will be considered sufficient for a payment greater than the established
price. The effect of this decision seems to permit the government to requisition at the same price that was set to restrict inflationary selling. If at
the time of the enactment of this. ceiling price, the legislature had intended
that it should be applied as the measure of just compensation, there might
have been a problem of deciding whether this was a taking of property
without due process,

HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTSCONFINEMENT BY MILITARY COMMISSION
After the unconditional surrender of Germany and before the cessation
of hostilities with Japan, German citizens engaged in military service for
the Japanese government in China. They were convicted by a Military
Commission of the United States Army in China of violating laws of war,
and were transferred to Germany to serve their sentences. Their petitions
for habeas corpus against the Secretary of Defense were denied in the
District Court, but were reinstated by the Court of Appeals.1 Held, that
although the detaining official is within its territorial jurisdiction, a federal
court does not have jurisdiction of the petition for writ of habeas corpus
by a prisoner who at any relevant time is not. Johnson v. Eisentrager,70
Sup. Ct. 936 (1950).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 558.

See note 22 suptra.
56 STAT. 31, 50 U.S.C. App. J 924 (1942).
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., supra note 23, at 553.

28. Id. at 552.

1. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

